Freedom
Freedom…
Big word, ay’?
Freedom is the condition of an agent in a system: the paths of possibilities. We call it freedom of outcomes or freedom of actions, the range of actions. Freedom of decisions is the first abstract action in the system. Freedom is not action, but freedom to decide between outcomes is the usual “freedom” that we speak of as humans.
Inside one’s head, freedom must be total; no eventuality must be dismissed a priori. Then, based on this frictionless freedom to think of any possible action, one must decide. Then the decision has to be aligned with the being and the coordinated intentionality of each individual.
Before choosing, freedom bears no judgemental value, that is liberum arbitrium, the innate capacity to choose either way. What we learn is libertas: the acquired capacity to choose well; being an autonomous agent, unburdened by exterior factors, bound only by the soundness of the moral choice to be made.
You are free to fail as you are free to not fail. Free will is usually seen as an unbothered sovereignty of the individual over its destiny. This free will can be total inside one’s head, but the outcome of any decision: if taken with and because of free will, judgement will be the greatest factor in the decision.
I can do surgery because I’m in the surgery room. I guarantee I can freely choose to do it. Is this good or bad? Depending on the issue of my actions, if I’m the doctor, then fine; if I’m a 1st-year observer student, maybe it’s not a good idea, and the action will not be morally sound.
We see that free will, while a simple mind-tool of decision, has to obey internal and external constraints so that the intentionality of the resulting action is morally valid: integrated in a wholesome social system, as human morality is imperfect and relative to the epoch and society; some common ground is accepted across cultures; in this regard, we can assess that there is a kind of moral absolute-ish that we can follow, but this is another discussion.
Is an insane person free?
It lacks judgement, so while the first part of free will exists: the instrumentality of decision-making, it lacks the blueprint, or the moral map, to make the right decision. He will wander in the fields or in counter-sense because he does not know the rules, or, as being insane, he cannot learn or figure out the right rules. Free will cannot be implied vs. the “normal” person, as the insane person or the animal has only either the sickness or the unalterable animal “instincts” for their actions.
Free will has then a moral component, and it must include judgement altogether. Judgement is the capacity of the self to direct its actions after pondering all the elements present in the node of decision.
One will say that there is no difference between the insane and the “free willer” because both are finally choosing a path that they did not really decide for themselves, but rather external factors decided: for one, a very reductionist factor (his illness); for the other, the broad result of all the factors gathered and weighed in the system.
This is the way of hard determinists, who will argue that no one is really free and morality is merely an illusion, as everybody is determined by blind causality, thus, no "free will" is possible. This view is absolute, and while defensible in theory, it is inapplicable to social reality and merely nihilistic.
I prefer the compatibilist view, which makes a major distinction that empowers our actions with the quality of reason and moral sound reflection.
The main difference between the insane and the "free willer" is that the latter is reasonable, has the awareness and the capacity to change course; you can explain to him the right path, and he will get along on it because he sees that there is a better way, a higher way. We say that “only the crazy do not change their mind”. An animal will forever do the same pattern and cannot think outside the “animal mind” he is entrapped in. A human exercising free will has the capacity and will use it from time to time to “know better” and “do better.”
The thief
Let’s say you can steal money from a thief, and nobody will ever know it. Will you do it? It is still not a moral action: taking money that is not yours, for no morally valid reason, no matter what, will you do it? You can say that you will use the money for the poor, or to educate yourself, right! But still, you did not earn this money; you stole it.
The fruit of the poisonous tree is poisoned.
Being a better human being does not give you the right to steal, even from a thief. There is the free will that comes through. In these friction situations, free will will be the capacity to stick to the highest moral imperative, choosing good over a moral prejudice.
Here we have our definition of libertas: the acquired capacity to always choose the superior moral action.
While it may not be the best action for the body or the mind, it might be the best for the soul.
Remember Socrates? He chose to stay and die because he respected more his unstained moral condition and heritage than to flee and forfeit his whole exemplary life. We remember him also for this ultimate free will act of moral righteousness.
He had the uncorrupted free will by acting on the “never do wrong” axiom his whole life. Only then can he live without the corruption of wrong deeds, have a wholesome soul, and then be a complete human being.
Freedom… then, is to do whatever you want? Yes! But when you want, it better be good! Or, as Saint Augustine said:
"Dilige, et quod vis fac" - "Love, and do what you will."
Be good, for Christ’s sake!
Ay’?
